

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 155395

EXDIS, FOR TARNOFF AND LAKE FROM ANDERSON

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: OGEN

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY'S EXECUTIVE SESSION
STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
COMMITTEE JUNE 19.

2. BEGIN TEXT. I WANT TO PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND THEN TAKE YOUR FURTHER
QUESTIONS.

THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS IN THE THIRD WORLD

THE LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE MENTIONED THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND
THE PERSIAN GULF IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
AND THE COMPETITION WHICH THIS RELATIONSHIP ENGENDERS IN
THE THIRD WORLD.

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THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS STILL NOT
ENTIRELY CLEAR IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT COUP.

AFGHANISTAN HAS FOR MANY YEARS CAREFULLY PRESERVED ITS
BALANCED ROLE BETWEEN THE STRONGER STATES WHICH

SURROUND IT. THIS AFGHAN POLICY HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE
PRESERVATION OF ITS INDEPENDENCE AND HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY
MOST OF ITS NEIGHBORS. WE WOULD BE CONCERNED, AND THE
STABILITY OF THE REGION WOULD SUFFER, SHOULD AFGHANISTAN'S

POLICIES TURN AWAY FROM ITS TRADITIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

THE PRESENT AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONSISTS PRIMARILY OF MEMBERS OF AFGHANISTAN'S PRO-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES. NEVERTHELESS THEY HAVE AVOIDED DESCRIBING THEIR GOVERNMENT AS COMMUNIST OR MARXIST-LENINIST; THEY HAVE EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO WORK AND COOPERATE WITH ALL COUNTRIES AND TO PRESERVE THEIR NON-ALIGNED POSITION. WHILE THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT ARE CLOSE AND INCREASED NUMBERS OF SOVIET ADVISORS AND TECHNICIANS ARE PRESENT, THERE ARE STRONG ISLAMIC, TRIBAL, AND NATIONALISTIC PRESSURES WORKING TO KEEP AFGHANISTAN'S POLICIES FROM TURNING FURTHER TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE CONCLUDED, THEREFORE, THAT FOR THE PRESENT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN TIES TO THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND WE HAVE TOLD THE AFGHANS WE ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS OUR CURRENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WITH THEM. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORT THE SECURITY AND INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN'S SOUTHERN AND WESTERN NEIGHBORS.

IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, SOVIET POLICIES HAVE STIMULATED RENEWED CONCERN ABOUT THIS VITAL REGION. OUR EFFORTS TO
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ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION, OUR SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, AND THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF A LIMITED U.S. NAVAL FORCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARE ALL PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO HELP THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION PRESERVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND STABILITY.

IN MY PUBLIC STATEMENT I MENTIONED SEVERAL STEPS WHICH WE WERE TAKING TO INDUCE SOVIET MODERATION IN AFRICA. LET ME ELABORATE FURTHER ON TWO OF THESE STEPS:

-- AS A RESULT OF THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WHICH THE PRESIDENT AND I HAVE HAD WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS WHICH THEIR ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA POSE FOR OUR OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONS. AS I INDICATED EARLIER, OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK WAYS TO COOPERATE AND WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS AND DISPUTES PEACEFULLY. NEVERTHELESS WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET COURSE IN AFRICA, IF CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE U.S. IT WILL ALSO RAISE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS IN OUR MINDS ABOUT

SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND AT SOME POINT MAY IMPACT DIRECTLY ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

AS I SAID IN OPEN SESSION EARLIER, THE BASIC THRUST OF

OUR AFRICA POLICY IS AN AFFIRMATIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO HELPING AFRICAN NATIONS MEET THEIR PRESSING ECONOMIC NEEDS, TO STRENGTHEN THEIR ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, TO BUILD CLOSER TIES WITH AFRICA, AND TO ASSIST AFRICAN NATIONS TO RESOLVE THEIR CONFLICTS PEACEFULLY.

LOOKING AT OUR RECORD OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS, WE CAN TAKE SOME SATISFACTION IN THE RESULTS OF THIS APPROACH:
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-- WE NOW HAVE CLOSE AND STRONG TIES WITH THREE KEY COUNTRIES WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE SOUGHT INFLUENCE FOR YEARS. I SPEAK OF NIGERIA, TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA.

-- WE NOW HAVE IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH FOUR NATIONS IN WHICH THE SOVIETS HAD VERY SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE. THESE ARE SUDAN, SOMALIA, CONGO BRAZZAVILLE AND GUINEA. WE ARE BUILDING ON THESE RELATIONS.

-- WE NOW ARE IMPROVING OUR RELATIONS WITH FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES WHICH HAD BEEN VERY COOL TO US AT THE TIME OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE. THESE ARE MOZAMBIQUE AND GUINEA-BISSAU.

-- AND IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT WE CAN IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA AND ANGOLA AT SOME POIN IN THE FUTURE. I WILL DISCUSS LATER THE IMPORTANCE OF ANGOLA IN TERMS OF OUR POLICIES BOTH TOWARD ZAIRE AND NAMIBIA. I WOULD ONLY NOTE AT THIS TIME THAT WE BELIEVE IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO INCREASE OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT AND BEGIN WORKING WITH IT IN MORE NORMAL WAYS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN ANGOLA AND ZAIRE, AS WELL AS IN ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT FOR NAMIBIA.

-- AS PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO BOLSTER THE SECURITY OF THOSE AFRICAN NATIONS WHO LEGITIMATELY FEEL THEMSELVES THREATENED, WE HAVE RESPONDED TO SOME OF THE MORE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN THE FOLLOWING DAYS:

IN SUDAN, THE UNITY ACHIEVED AFTER YEARS OF CIVIL WAR IS CONSTANTLY THREATENED BY LIBYA-BACKED INSURGENTS; AND IT
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FACES NEW THREATS FROM THE SOVIET ARMS BUILDUP IN ETHIOPIA. WE HAVE AGREED TO SELL SUDAN TWELVE F-5 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT AND SIX C-130'S.

CHAD, WHICH IS FIGHTING TO PRESERVE ITS TERRITORIAL

INTEGRITY AGAINST LIBYA-BACKED INSURGENTS, HAS BEEN MADE ELIGIBLE TO BUY U.S. ARMS AND RECEIVE THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS.

KENYA, WHICH HAS CONCENTRATED ITS RESOURCES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RATHER THAN ON PURCHASING ARMS, CONFRONTS SOMALI IRRIDENTIST CLAIMS TO MUCH OF ITS TERRITORY IN THE NORTH, AND A SOVIET-ARMED URGANDA TO THE WEST. IT WILL PURCHASE U.S. ARMS TO HELP MODERNIZE ITS FORCES.

ZAMBIA BORDERS ON ANGOLA, NAMIBIA, RHODESIA AND THE SHABA PROVINCE OF ZAIRE. PRESIDENT KAUNDA NEEDS TO DEMONSTRATE TO HIS MILITARY AND HIS PEOPLE THAT THE WEST IS CONCERNED ABOUT STABILITY IN ZAMBIA, AND THAT THERE IS AN ALTERNATIVE TO RELYING ON THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE CONSIDERING PROVIDING ZAMBIA WITH LIMITED QUANTITIES OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION.

SPECIFICS OF U.S. AFRICAN POLICY

IT MAY BE USEFUL TO THE COMMITTEE IF I DISCUSS THE SPECIFICS OF OUR POLICY IN AFRICA ON A REGION BY REGION BASIS.

NORTH AFRICA

IN NORTH AFRICA OUR RELATIONS WITH VIRTUALLY ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION ARE NOW EXCELLENT OR IMPROVING.

WITH EGYPT WE ENJOY A CLOSE ASSOCIATION ENHANCED BY OUR MUTUAL CONCERN IN FINDING A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT
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AND PRESIDENT CARTER'S WARM PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH PRESIDENT SADAT. TUNISIA AND MOROCCO CONTINUE TO PLAY IMPORTANT MODERATING ROLES BOTH WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED COMMUNITY AND ON MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICAN ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE U.S. MOROCCO IN PARTICULAR HAS CONTRIBUTED TWICE IN THE LAST YEAR TO STABILITY AND PEACE IN AFRICA BY SENDING TROOPS TO THE SHABA AREA OF ZAIRE AFTER INVASIONS BY KANTANGAN INSURGENTS.

OUR RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA HAVE MEASURABLY IMPROVED. OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS IN THE ENERGY FIELD HAVE LED TO ALGERIA'S BECOMING INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE TO AMERICAN BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT THERE. ALGERIA'S EXPORT TO THE U.S. OF NATURAL GAS AND OIL HAS BEEN MATCHED BY THE GROWING NUMBERS OF US TECHNICIANS, NEW US TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT IN ALGERIA.

LIBYA IS A CLEAR EXCEPTION TO OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH NORTH AFRICAN NATIONS. ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO IMPORT

LIBYAN OIL AND HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT OUR INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS, LIBYA'S STRONG SUPPORT OF THE "REJECTIONIST FRONT" IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ITS ASSISTANCE TO SOME TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND ITS SUPPORT FOR INSURGENTS IN CHAD HAVE POSED SERIOUS OBSTACLES IN DEVELOPING BETTER RELATIONS.

THE ONE REGIONAL DISPUTE IN NORTHERN AFRICA IS THAT BETWEEN MOROCCO, MAURITANIA AND ALGERIA OVER THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FORMER SPANISH SAHARA. THE US HAS REMAINED NEUTRAL, BELIEVING THAT ARAB AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS ARE BETTER SUITED FOR A MEDIATING ROLE. WE HAVE URGED RESTRAINT AND AN EFFORT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, HOWEVER, AND THE DISPUTE HAS NOT AFFECTED OUR RELATIONS
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WITH THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

THE HORN

OUR RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA HAVE IMPROVED AND WE ARE PREPARED TO HELP THAT COUNTRY WITH THE SEVERE ECONOMIC AND HUMAN PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE WAR.

WE FACE AN IMPORTANT DECISION ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO PROVIDE ARMS TO SOMALIA. WE ARE TROUBLED BY INDICATIONS THAT SOMALIA MAY BE PROVIDING AID TO INSURGENTS IN THE OGADEN. IF SO, THIS RENEWED SOMALI INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE ASSURANCES GIVEN TO US BY PRESIDENT SIAD BARRE THAT HE WOULD RESPECT HIS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS WITH ETHIOPIA AND KENYA. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN CLOSER TIES TO SOMALIA, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO ENTER INTO AN ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE TENSION AND INSTABILITY IN THE REGION. HEIGHTENED INSURGENT ACTIVITIES IN THE OGADEN PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR CONTINUED CUBAN AND SOVIET PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA.

BEFORE ANY FINAL DECISION ON ARMS SALES TO SOMALIA IS MADE WE WILL SEND A MILITARY SURVEY TEAM TO THAT COUNTRY TO ASSESS ITS NEEDS FOR COMMUNICATIONS, ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE COMMITTEE ON THIS MATTER.

IN ERITREA, THE ETHIOPIANS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CRUSH THE REBELLION OR TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS. THE CUBANS TO DATE HAVE REMAINED OUT OF COMBAT IN ERITREA. IT IS CLEAR THAT ERITREA POSES MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS

AND CUBANS: THE STRENGTH OF THE INSURGENTS AND THEIR COMMITMENT TO THEIR CAUSE MAKE A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE ERITREAN CONFLICT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT; THE RADICAL ARAB

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STATES STRONGLY OPPOSE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION; YET THE ETHIOPIANS ARE PRESSING THE SOVIETS FOR MORE DIRECT ASSISTANCE AND WILL RESENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO AVOID DEEPER INVOLVEMENT.

WE ARE COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION IN ERITREA. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THAT CONFLICT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET ADVISORS AND CUBAN TROOPS FROM ETHIOPIA.

WE ARE SEEKING TO MAINTAIN TIES TO ETHIOPIA. WE HAVE RECENTLY SENT A NEW AMBASSADOR TO ADDIS ABABA AND WE ARE TRYING TO CONTINUE A LIMITED PROGRAM OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE ETHIOPIANS APPEAR WILLING TO KEEP THESE CHANNELS OPEN SO THAT THEY ARE NOT TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION.

ZAIRE

AS IN THE HORN, ZAIRE'S PROBLEMS CAUSE GREAT HUMAN SUFFERING AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP.

OUR BASIC POLICY TOWARDS ZAIRE INVOLVES THE PRESERVATION OF ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ASSISTANCE TO HELP PROMOTE ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY. EVEN IF STABILITY IS RESTORED IN SHABA THIS WOULD NOT MEAN THAT ZAIRE'S BASIC PROBLEMS WILL HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

ZAIRE'S FUTURE WILL DEPEND ON ITS ABILITY TO OVERCOME THE WEAKNESSES WHICH WERE SO VISIBLE IN THE RECENT SHABA CRISIS. ZAIRE'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, ITS INABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF MILITARILY, AND ITS POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION RESULT PARTLY FROM YEARS OF CHAOS, MISMANAGEMENT AND CORRUPTION. GOVERNMENT POLICIES HAVE EXACERBATED THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS FACED BY A HUGE AND ETHNICALLY DIVERSE COUNTRY, WHERE LITTLE WAS DONE DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO PREPARE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY FOR INDEPENDENCE.

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MENT AND CORRUPTION. GOVERNMENT POLICIES HAVE EXACERBATED THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS FACED BY A HUGE AND ETHNICALLY DIVERSE COUNTRY, WHERE LITTLE WAS DONE DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO PREPARE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY FOR INDEPENDENCE.

ZAIRE'S ECONOMY CANNOT BE VIABLE UNLESS AND UNTIL THAT NATION UNDERTAKES SERIOUS AND FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. WE AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL STRONGLY URGE PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO EMBARK ON A PROGRAM OF REFORM IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF THE COUNTRY AND FURTHER POLITICAL INSTABILITY. THE US HAS DECIDED TO MAKE OUR AID TO ZAIRE CONDITIONAL ON

EXTENSIVE REFORM. WE ARE URGING OUR ALLIES TO FOLLOW THIS SAME COURSE.

ZAIRE'S OTHER MAJOR PROBLEM CONCERNS ITS BORDER WITH ANGOLA. THE SECURITY OF THIS BORDER IS CRITICAL TO ZAIRES ECONOMIC VIABILITY AS A WORLD MINERAL SUPPLIER. FOR YEARS, ZAIRE AND ANGOLA HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY IN EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY BY PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO INSURGENT GROUPS ACROSS THIS BORDER. THE REDUCTION OF TENSION ALONG THE ZAIRE-ANGOLA BORDER CAN ONLY COME ABOUT IF THESE TWO NATIONS REACH AN AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THEIR MUTUAL BORDERS AND RENOUNCE INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. PAST NIGERIAN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE SUCH AN AGREEMENT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. WE WILL WORK FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

THE AFRICAN FORCES NOW IN SHABA TO SECURE THE AREA AND TO PERMIT RETURN OF THE ZAIRIAN ECONOMY TO NORMALCY NOW TOTALS OVER 2,000 MEN. OUR OWN LIMITED COMMITMENT WAS TO PROVIDE AIRLIFT FOR THE MEN AND MATERIAL INVOLVED. WE HAVE MET THAT COMMITMENT EFFECTIVELY AND RAPIDLY; ALL OUR CONFIDENTIAL

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PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE LIFT HAVE NOW RETURNED TO THEIR BASES IN THE UNITED STATES OR EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED ARE ANXIOUS TO REPLACE THESE AFRICAN FORCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH DISCIPLINED, WELL-TRAINED ZAIRIAN TROOPS, AND WE ARE CONSULTING ABOUT THE NEED FOR A TERMINAL DATE FOR THE OPERATION.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA CONTINUES TO BE A PRIMARY FOCUS OF OUR AFRICA POLICY.

IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT I REVIEW HERE THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF OUR RECENT EFFORTS WITH THE BRITISH TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA.

WE ARE UNDER CONFLICTING PRESSURES TO ENDORSE ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER IN THIS DISPUTE. ABROAD, MANY PEOPLE URGE US TO BACK THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AT HOME, WE ARE OFTEN ASKED TO BACK IAN SMITH AND THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.

IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO BE DRAWN INTO FAVORING ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER. IF WE DID SO, WE COULD NO LONGER ACT AS A HONEST BROKER BETWEEN THEM. IN THE ABSENCE OF MEDIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THE CHANCES FOR A CIVIL WAR WOULD INCREASE. WE BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT IS STILL

POSSIBLE.

THE BROKER'S ROLE IS NOT AN EASY ONE, AS WE HAVE LEARNED
IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HERE AGAIN WE NEED THE COMMITTEE'S
GUIDANCE AS WELL AS ITS HELP IN EXPLAINING THE SITUATION
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TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

IN NAMIBIA, WE ARE CLOSE TO A SETTLEMENT, BUT WE CAN NOT
FORGET THAT MISTRUST BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS DEEP AND THAT
A SETTLEMENT MAY STILL ELUDE US. OVER THE FOURTEEN LONG
MONTHS OF NEGOTIATION WE HAVE SUCCEEDED, WITH THE
VALUABLE ASSISTANCE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES, IN
NARROWING WHAT WAS AN ENORMOUS GAP BETWEEN THE POSITIONS
OF SWAPO AND SOUTH AFRICA. TWO ISSUES REMAIN: THE
FUTURE OF THE PORT OF WALVIS BAY AND THE LOCATION OF
RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WHICH WILL STAY IN NAMIBIA
DURING THE TRANSITION.

WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE ISSUES OF THE FUTURE
OF THE PORT OF WALVIS BAY CAN BE RESOLVED. THE QUESTION
OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOP LOCATION, GIVEN THE MISTRUST
EXACERBATED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAID ON SWAPO CAMPS IN
ANGOLA, WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT. BECAUSE OF SWAPO'S
CLOSE DEPENDENCE ON ANGOLAN SUPPORT, THE INFLUENCE OF THE
ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT IN ACHIEVING A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT IS
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR

IN THE AREA OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS THE PRESIDENT
AND I CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY
TO CHANNEL OUR CONCERNS AND ADVANCE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS
INTERESTS. OBVIOUSLY OUR OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO SCORE
DEBATING POINTS, BUT TO SEEK MEASURABLE IMPROVEMENT IN
HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN THE USSR. WE HAVE NO WAY TO
ENSURE THAT PERSONS SUCH AS SHCHARANSKIY, ORLOV, GINSBURG
AND SLEPAK ARE SPARED HARSH TREATMENT, BUT WE HAVE MADE
KNOWN TO THE SOVIETS THE ADVERSE AFFECT SUCH TREATMENT HAS
ON AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION AND ULTI-
MATELY ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.
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WORKING WITH THE CONGRESS

ACHIEVING THE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES I HAVE MENTIONED
DEPENDS ON A CLOSE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.

WE ARE NOW FACED WITH A BROAD ARRAY OF STATUTORY

PROHIBITIONS, CONDITIONS, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND COMPLEX PROCEDURES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT MANY OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS WHICH NOW FILL THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION WERE DRAFTED IN RESPONSE TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH ABUSES OF AUTHORITY AND THE LEGITIMATE DESIRE OF THE CONGRESS TO BE MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS.

WE BELIEVE THAT SOME OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS OF THE PAST CAN BE MODIFIED OR RESTRUCTURED IN A WAY THAT WILL PRESERVE THE LEGITIMATE ROLE OF CONGRESS AS AN EFFECTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY. OUR GOAL IS SIMPLY TO MAKE THE PROCESS AS EFFICIENT AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO SERVE THE US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CONDUCTED A STUDY OF THESE CONSTRAINTS. IT IS NOW WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS REVIEW. I EXPECT TO DISCUSS THE STUDY WITH HIM IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. AFTER I HAVE DONE SO, WE WILL CONSULT WITH THE CONGRESS ABOUT POSSIBLE SHORT AND LONG TERM CHANGES.

WE ARE AWARE THAT IT IS LATE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS TO PROPOSE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE PENDING BILLS. IN VIEW
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OF THIS FACT, ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES WHICH WE MAY PROPOSE WILL MOST LIKELY HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL NEXT YEAR. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WILL STRONGLY OPPOSE NEW RESTRICTIONS IN PENDING LEGISLATION, PARTICULARLY PROHIBITIONS ON INDIRECT AID TO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES. WE WILL WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THIS COMMITTEE IN ANY PROPOSALS WE MAY MAKE TO REVISE THE STATUTES GOVERNING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

THE VOTE ON THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATION BILL THIS WEEK IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE IN THIS REGARD.

THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE HAS CUT OVER \$1 BILLION FROM OUR \$8.4 BILLION FOREIGN AID REQUEST. IN ADDITION WE EXPECT AMENDMENTS TO BE OFFERED WHICH COULD CUT THIS SUM BY ANOTHER BILLION DOLLARS. WHILE WE WILL NOT TRY TO RESTORE THE ORIGINAL CUTS ON THE FLOOR, WE BELIEVE THAT ADDITIONAL CUTS WOULD SEVERELY DISRUPT THESE PROGRAMS AND HAVE SERIOUS FOREIGN POLICY CONSEQUENCES. WE ASK THAT YOU VOTE AGAINST THESE CUTS AND CONTINUE TO WORK WITH US IN GATHERING SUPPORT TO HOLD THE LINE ON PRESENT LEVELS. END TEXT. VANCE

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S/S-O:KDSCOTT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 155395

EXDIS FOR AMB YOUNG FROM UNA

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NEVERTHELESS WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET COURSE IN AFRICA, IF CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE U.S. IT WILL ALSO RAISE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS IN OUR MINDS ABOUT

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ECONOMIC NEEDS, TO STRENGTHEN THEIR ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, TO BUILD CLOSER TIES WITH AFRICA, AND TO ASSIST AFRICAN NATIONS TO RESOLVE THEIR CONFLICTS PEACEFULLY.

LOOKING AT OUR RECORD OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS, WE CAN TAKE SOME SATISFACTION IN THE RESULTS OF THIS APPROACH:

-- WE NOW HAVE CLOSE AND STRONG TIES WITH THREE KEY COUNTRIES WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE SOUGHT INFLUENCE FOR YEARS. I SPEAK OF NIGERIA, TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA.

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-- WE NOW ARE IMPROVING OUR RELATIONS WITH FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES WHICH HAD BEEN VERY COOL TO US AT THE TIME OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE. THESE ARE MOZAMBIQUE AND GUINEA-BISSAU.

-- AND IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT WE CAN IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA AND ANGOLA AT SOME POIN IN THE FUTURE. I WILL DISCUSS LATER THE IMPORTANCE OF ANGOLA IN TERMS OF OUR POLICIES BOTH TOWARD ZAIRE AND NAMIBIA. I WOULD ONLY NOTE AT THIS TIME THAT WE BELIEVE IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO INCREASE OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT AND BEGIN WORKING WITH IT IN MORE NORMAL WAYS IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN ANGOLA AND ZAIRE, AS WELL AS IN ACHIEVING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT FOR NAMIBIA.

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NORTH AFRICA

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COUNTRIES OF THE REGION ARE NOW EXCELLENT OR IMPROVING.

WITH EGYPT WE ENJOY A CLOSE ASSOCIATION ENHANCED BY
OUR MUTUAL CONCERN IN FINDING A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT
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OUR RELATIONS WITH ALGERIA HAVE MEASURABLY IMPROVED. OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS IN THE ENERGY FIELD HAVE LED TO ALGERIA'S BECOMING INCREASINGLY RECEPTIVE TO AMERICAN BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT THERE. ALGERIA'S EXPORT TO THE U.S. OF NATURAL GAS AND OIL HAS BEEN MATCHED BY THE GROWING NUMBERS OF US TECHNICIANS, NEW US TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT IN ALGERIA.

LIBYA IS A CLEAR EXCEPTION TO OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH NORTH AFRICAN NATIONS. ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUE TO IMPORT LIBYAN OIL AND HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT OUR INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS, LIBYA'S STRONG SUPPORT OF THE "REJECTIONIST FRONT" IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ITS ASSISTANCE TO SOME TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND ITS SUPPORT FOR INSURGENTS IN CHAD HAVE POSED SERIOUS OBSTACLES IN DEVELOPING BETTER RELATIONS.

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THE ONE REGIONAL DISPUTE IN NORTHERN AFRICA IS THAT BETWEEN MOROCCO, MAURITANIA AND ALGERIA OVER THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FORMER SPANISH SAHARA. THE US HAS REMAINED NEUTRAL, BELIEVING THAT ARAB AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS ARE BETTER SUITED FOR A MEDIATING ROLE. WE HAVE URGED RESTRAINT AND AN EFFORT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, HOWEVER, AND THE DISPUTE HAS NOT AFFECTED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

THE HORN

OUR RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA HAVE IMPROVED AND WE ARE PREPARED TO HELP THAT COUNTRY WITH THE SEVERE ECONOMIC AND HUMAN PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE WAR.

WE FACE AN IMPORTANT DECISION ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO PROVIDE ARMS TO SOMALIA. WE ARE TROUBLED BY INDICATIONS THAT SOMALIA MAY BE PROVIDING AID TO INSURGENTS IN THE OGADEN. IF SO, THIS RENEWED SOMALI INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE ASSURANCES GIVEN TO US BY PRESIDENT SIAD BARRE THAT HE WOULD RESPECT HIS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS WITH ETHIOPIA AND KENYA. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN CLOSER TIES TO SOMALIA, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO ENTER INTO AN ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE TENSION AND INSTABILITY IN THE REGION. HEIGHTENED INSURGENT ACTIVITIES IN THE OGADEN PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR CONTINUED CUBAN AND SOVIET PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA.

BEFORE ANY FINAL DECISION ON ARMS SALES TO SOMALIA IS MADE WE WILL SEND A MILITARY SURVEY TEAM TO THAT COUNTRY TO ASSESS ITS NEEDS FOR COMMUNICATIONS, ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN CLOSE

CONTACT WITH THE COMMITTEE ON THIS MATTER.

IN ERITREA, THE ETHIOPIANS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CRUSH
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THE REBELLION OR TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS. THE CUBANS
TO DATE HAVE REMAINED OUT OF COMBAT IN ERITREA. IT IS
CLEAR THAT ERITREA POSES MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS

AND CUBANS: THE STRENGTH OF THE INSURGENTS AND THEIR
COMMITMENT TO THEIR CAUSE MAKE A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE
ERITREAN CONFLICT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT; THE RADICAL ARAB
STATES STRONGLY OPPOSE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION; YET
THE ETHIOPIANS ARE PRESSING THE SOVIETS FOR MORE DIRECT
ASSISTANCE AND WILL RESENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO AVOID DEEPER
INVOLVEMENT.

WE ARE COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION IN
ERITREA. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A NEGOTIATED
SETTLEMENT TO THAT CONFLICT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET
ADVISORS AND CUBAN TROOPS FROM ETHIOPIA.

WE ARE SEEKING TO MAINTAIN TIES TO ETHIOPIA. WE HAVE
RECENTLY SENT A NEW AMBASSADOR TO ADDIS ABABA AND WE ARE
TRYING TO CONTINUE A LIMITED PROGRAM OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE. THE ETHIOPIANS APPEAR WILLING TO KEEP THESE
CHANNELS OPEN SO THAT THEY ARE NOT TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON
THE SOVIET UNION.

ZAIRE

AS IN THE HORN, ZAIRE'S PROBLEMS CAUSE GREAT HUMAN
SUFFERING AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP.

OUR BASIC POLICY TOWARDS ZAIRE INVOLVES THE PRESERVATION
OF ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ASSISTANCE TO HELP
PROMOTE ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY. EVEN IF
STABILITY IS RESTORED IN SHABA THIS WOULD NOT MEAN THAT
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ZAIRE'S BASCI PROBLEMS WILL HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

ZAIRE'S FUTURE WILL DEPEND ON ITS ABILITY TO OVERCOME
THE WEAKNESSES WHICH WERE SO VISIBLE IN THE RECENT SHABA
CRISIS. ZAIRE'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, ITS
INABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF MILITARILY, AND ITS POLITICAL
FRAGMENTATION RESULT PARTLY FROM YEARS OF CHAOS, MISMANAGE-
MENT AND CORRUPTION. GOVERNMENT POLICIES HAVE EXACERBATED
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS FACED BY A HUGE AND ETHNICALLY
DIVERSE COUNTRY, WHERE LITTLE WAS DONE DURING THE COLONIAL

PERIOD TO PREPARE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY FOR INDEPENDENCE.

ZAIRE'S ECONOMY CANNOT BE VIABLE UNLESS AND UNTIL THAT NATION UNDERTAKES SERIOUS AND FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. WE AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL STRONGLY URGE PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO EMBARK ON A PROGRAM OF REFORM IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF THE COUNTRY AND FURTHER POLITICAL INSTABILITY. THE US HAS DECIDED TO MAKE OUR AID TO ZAIRES CONDITIONAL ON

EXTENSIVE REFORM. WE ARE URGING OUR ALLIES TO FOLLOW THIS SAME COURSE.

ZAIRE'S OTHER MAJOR PROBLEM CONCERNS ITS BORDER WITH ANGOLA. THE SECURITY OF THIS BORDER IS CRITICAL TO ZAIRES ECONOMIC VIABILITY AS A WORLD MINERAL SUPPLIER. FOR YEARS, ZAIRES AND ANGOLA HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY IN EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY BY PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO INSURGENT GROUPS ACROSS THIS BORDER. THE REDUCTION OF TENSION ALONG THE ZAIRES-ANGOLA BORDER CAN ONLY COME ABOUT IF THESE TWO NATIONS REACH AN AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THEIR MUTUAL BORDERS AND RENOUNCE INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. PAST NIGERIAN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE SUCH AN AGREEMENT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. WE WILL WORK FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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FUTURE.

THE AFRICAN FORCES NOW IN SHABA TO SECURE THE AREA AND TO PERMIT RETURN OF THE ZAIREAN ECONOMY TO NORMALCY NOW TOTALS OVER 2,000 MEN. OUR OWN LIMITED COMMITMENT WAS TO PROVIDE AIRLIFT FOR THE MEN AND MATERIAL INVOLVED. WE HAVE MET THAT COMMITMENT EFFECTIVELY AND RAPIDLY; ALL OUR PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE LIFT HAVE NOW RETURNED TO THEIR BASES IN THE UNITED STATES OR EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL PARTIES CONCERNED ARE ANXIOUS TO REPLACE THESE AFRICAN FORCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH DISCIPLINED, WELL-TRAINED ZAIREAN TROOPS, AND WE ARE CONSULTING ABOUT THE NEED FOR A TERMINAL DATE FOR THE OPERATION.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA CONTINUES TO BE A PRIMARY FOCUS OF OUR AFRICA POLICY.

IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT I REVIEW HERE THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF OUR RECENT EFFORTS WITH THE BRITISH TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA.

WE ARE UNDER CONFLICTING PRESSURES TO ENDORSE ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER IN THIS DISPUTE. ABROAD, MANY PEOPLE URGE US TO BACK THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AT HOME, WE ARE OFTEN ASKED TO BACK IAN SMITH AND THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.

IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO BE DRAWN INTO FAVORING ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER. IF WE DID SO, WE COULD NO LONGER ACT AS A HONEST BROKER BETWEEN THEM. IN THE ABSENCE OF MEDIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THE CHANCES FOR A CIVIL
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WAR WOULD INCREASE. WE BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT IS STILL
POSSIBLE.

THE BROKER'S ROLE IS NOT AN EASY ONE, AS WE HAVE LEARNED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HERE AGAIN WE NEED THE COMMITTEE'S GUIDANCE AS WELL AS ITS HELP IN EXPLAINING THE SITUATION TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

IN NAMIBIA, WE ARE CLOSE TO A SETTLEMENT, BUT WE CAN NOT FORGET THAT MISTRUST BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS DEEP AND THAT A SETTLEMENT MAY STILL ELUDE US. OVER THE FOURTEEN LONG MONTHS OF NEGOTIATION WE HAVE SUCCEEDED, WITH THE VALUABLE ASSISTANCE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES, IN NARROWING WHAT WAS AN ENORMOUS GAP BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF SWAPO AND SOUTH AFRICA. TWO ISSUES REMAIN: THE FUTURE OF THE PORT OF WALVIS BAY AND THE LOCATION OF RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WHICH WILL STAY IN NAMIBIA DURING THE TRANSITION.

WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE ISSUES OF THE FUTURE OF THE PORT OF WALVIS BAY CAN BE RESOLVED. THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOP LOCATION, GIVEN THE MISTRUST EXACERBATED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAID ON SWAPO CAMPS IN ANGOLA, WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT. BECAUSE OF SWAPO'S CLOSE DEPENDENCE ON ANGOLAN SUPPORT, THE INFLUENCE OF THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT IN ACHIEVING A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR

IN THE AREA OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS THE PRESIDENT AND I CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO CHANNEL OUR CONCERNS AND ADVANCE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS INTERESTS. OBVIOUSLY OUR OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO SCORE
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DEBATING POINTS, BUT TO SEEK MEASURABLE IMPROVEMENT IN

HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN THE USSR. WE HAVE NO WAY TO ENSURE THAT PERSONS SUCH AS SHCHARANSKIY, ORLOV, GINSBURG AND SLEPAK ARE SPARED HARSH TREATMENT, BUT WE HAVE MADE KNOWN TO THE SOVIETS THE ADVERSE AFFECT SUCH TREATMENT HAS ON AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION AND ULTIMATELY ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

WORKING WITH THE CONGRESS

ACHIEVING THE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES I HAVE MENTIONED DEPENDS ON A CLOSE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LADP528
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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 155395

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 155395 INFO USUN NEW YORK DATED JUNE 19, 1978.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 155395

EXDIS FOR AMB YOUNG FROM UNA

FOLLOWING TEL STATE 155395 ACTION OSLO DATED JUN 19:

QTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 155395

EXDIS, FOR TARNOFF AND LAKE FROM ANDERSON

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: OGEN

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S STATEMENT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY'S EXECUTIVE SESSION
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STATEMENT BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
COMMITTEE JUNE 19.

2. BEGIN TEXT. I WANT TO PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND THEN TAKE YOUR FURTHER
QUESTIONS.

THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS IN THE THIRD WORLD
THE LETTER FROM THE CHAIRMAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE MENTIONED THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND
THE PERSIAN GULF IN THE CONTEXT OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
AND THE COMPETITION WHICH THIS RELATIONSHIP ENGENDERS IN
THE THIRD WORLD.

THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN IS STILL NOT
ENTIRELY CLEAR IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT COUP.

AFGHANISTAN HAS FOR MANY YEARS CAREFULLY PRESERVED ITS
BALANCED ROLE BETWEEN THE STRONGER STATES WHICH

SURROUND IT. THIS AFGHAN POLICY HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE
PRESERVATION OF ITS INDEPENDENCE AND HAS BEEN WELCOMED BY
MOST OF ITS NEIGHBORS. WE WOULD BE CONCERNED, AND THE
STABILITY OF THE REGION WOULD SUFFER, SHOULD AFGHANISTAN'S
POLICIES TURN AWAY FROM ITS TRADITIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

THE PRESENT AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CONSISTS PRIMARILY OF
MEMBERS OF AFGHANISTAN'S PRO-COMMUNIST POLITICAL PARTIES.
NEVERTHELESS THEY HAVE AVOIDED DESCRIBING THEIR
GOVERNMENT AS COMMUNIST OR MARXIST-LENINIST; THEY HAVE
EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO WORK AND COOPERATE WITH ALL
COUNTRIES AND TO PRESERVE THEIR NON-ALIGNED POSITION.
WHILE THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GOVERN-
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MENT ARE CLOSE AND INCREASED NUMBERS OF SOVIET ADVISORS
AND TECHNICIANS ARE PRESENT, THERE ARE STRONG ISLAMIC,
TRIBAL, AND NATIONALISTIC PRESSURES WORKING TO KEEP
AFGHANISTAN'S POLICIES FROM TURNING FURTHER TOWARD THE
SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE CONCLUDED, THEREFORE, THAT FOR THE
PRESENT IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO MAINTAIN TIES TO THE NEW
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND WE HAVE TOLD THE AFGHANS WE ARE
WILLING TO DISCUSS OUR CURRENT AND POSSIBLE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WITH THEM. AT THE SAME
TIME, WE WILL ALSO STRONGLY SUPPORT THE SECURITY AND
INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN'S SOUTHERN AND WESTERN NEIGHBORS.

IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA, SOVIET POLICIES HAVE STIMULATED
RENEWED CONCERN ABOUT THIS VITAL REGION. OUR EFFORTS TO
ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRAMS OF THE COUNTRIES OF

THE REGION, OUR SALE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN, AND THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF A LIMITED U.S. NAVAL FORCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF ARE ALL PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO HELP THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION PRESERVE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND STABILITY.

IN MY PUBLIC STATEMENT I MENTIONED SEVERAL STEPS WHICH WE WERE TAKING TO INDUCE SOVIET MODERATION IN AFRICA. LET ME ELABORATE FURTHER ON TWO OF THESE STEPS:

-- AS A RESULT OF THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WHICH THE PRESIDENT AND I HAVE HAD WITH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS WHICH THEIR ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA POSE FOR OUR OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONS. AS I INDICATED EARLIER, OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK WAYS TO COOPERATE AND WORK WITH THE SOVIET UNION TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS AND DISPUTES PEACEFULLY. NEVERTHELESS WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET COURSE IN AFRICA, IF CONTINUED AND INTENSIFIED WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE U.S. IT WILL ALSO RAISE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS IN OUR MINDS ABOUT
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THE ONE REGIONAL DISPUTE IN NORTHERN AFRICA IS THAT BETWEEN MOROCCO, MAURITANIA AND ALGERIA OVER THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FORMER SPANISH SAHARA. THE US HAS REMAINED NEUTRAL, BELIEVING THAT ARAB AND OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS ARE BETTER SUITED FOR A MEDIATING ROLE. WE HAVE URGED RESTRAINT AND AN EFFORT TO FIND A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, HOWEVER, AND THE DISPUTE HAS NOT AFFECTED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

THE HORN

OUR RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA HAVE IMPROVED AND WE ARE PREPARED TO HELP THAT COUNTRY WITH THE SEVERE ECONOMIC AND HUMAN PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE WAR.

WE FACE AN IMPORTANT DECISION ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER TO PROVIDE ARMS TO SOMALIA. WE ARE TROUBLED BY INDICATIONS THAT SOMALIA MAY BE PROVIDING AID TO INSURGENTS

IN THE OGADEN. IF SO, THIS RENEWED SOMALI INVOLVEMENT WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF THE ASSURANCES GIVEN TO US BY PRESIDENT SIAD BARRE THAT HE WOULD RESPECT HIS INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS WITH ETHIOPIA AND KENYA. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN CLOSER TIES TO SOMALIA, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO ENTER INTO AN ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WHICH WILL ENCOURAGE TENSION AND INSTABILITY IN THE REGION. HEIGHTENED INSURGENT ACTIVITIES IN THE OGADEN PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR CONTINUED CUBAN AND SOVIET PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA.

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BEFORE ANY FINAL DECISION ON ARMS SALES TO SOMALIA IS MADE WE WILL SEND A MILITARY SURVEY TEAM TO THAT COUNTRY TO ASSESS ITS NEEDS FOR COMMUNICATIONS, ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT. WE WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE COMMITTEE ON THIS MATTER.

IN ERITREA, THE ETHIOPIANS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CRUSH THE REBELLION OR TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE REBELS. THE CUBANS TO DATE HAVE REMAINED OUT OF COMBAT IN ERITREA. IT IS CLEAR THAT ERITREA POSES MAJOR PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS

AND CUBANS: THE STRENGTH OF THE INSURGENTS AND THEIR COMMITMENT TO THEIR CAUSE MAKE A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE ERITREAN CONFLICT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT; THE RADICAL ARAB STATES STRONGLY OPPOSE SOVIET AND CUBAN INTERVENTION; YET THE ETHIOPIANS ARE PRESSING THE SOVIETS FOR MORE DIRECT ASSISTANCE AND WILL RESENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO AVOID DEEPER INVOLVEMENT.

WE ARE COMMITTED TO A POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION IN ERITREA. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THAT CONFLICT AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET ADVISORS AND CUBAN TROOPS FROM ETHIOPIA.

WE ARE SEEKING TO MAINTAIN TIES TO ETHIOPIA. WE HAVE RECENTLY SENT A NEW AMBASSADOR TO ADDIS ABABA AND WE ARE TRYING TO CONTINUE A LIMITED PROGRAM OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. THE ETHIOPIANS APPEAR WILLING TO KEEP THESE CHANNELS OPEN SO THAT THEY ARE NOT TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION.

ZAIRE

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AS IN THE HORN, ZAIRE'S PROBLEMS CAUSE GREAT HUMAN SUFFERING AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP.

OUR BASIC POLICY TOWARDS ZAIRE INVOLVES THE PRESERVATION OF ITS TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND ASSISTANCE TO HELP PROMOTE ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STABILITY. EVEN IF STABILITY IS RESTORED IN SHABA THIS WOULD NOT MEAN THAT ZAIRE'S BASCI PROBLEMS WILL HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

ZAIRE'S FUTURE WILL DEPEND ON ITS ABILITY TO OVERCOME THE WEAKNESSES WHICH WERE SO VISIBLE IN THE RECENT SHABA CRISIS. ZAIRE'S SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, ITS INABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF MILITARILY, AND ITS POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION RESULT PARTLY FROM YEARS OF CHAOS, MISMANAGEMENT AND CORRUPTION. GOVERNMENT POLICIES HAVE EXACERBATED THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS FACED BY A HUGE AND ETHNICALLY DIVERSE COUNTRY, WHERE LITTLE WAS DONE DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO PREPARE ECONOMICALLY AND POLITICALLY FOR INDEPENDENCE.

ZAIRE'S ECONOMY CANNOT BE VIABLE UNLESS AND UNTIL THAT NATION UNDERTAKES SERIOUS AND FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. WE AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WILL STRONGLY URGE PRESIDENT MOBUTU TO EMBARK ON A PROGRAM OF REFORM IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE ECONOMIC COLLASPE OF THE COUNTRY AND FURTHER POLITICAL INSTABILITY. THE US HAS DECIDED TO MAKE OUR AID TO ZAIRE CONDITIONAL ON

EXTENSIVE REFORM. WE ARE URGING OUR ALLIES TO FOLLOW THIS SAME COURSE.

ZAIRE'S OTHER MAJOR PROBLEM CONCERNS ITS BORDER WITH ANGOLA. THE SECURITY OF THIS BORDER IS CRITICAL TO ZAIRE'S ECONOMIC VIABILITY AS A WORLD MINERAL SUPPLIER. FOR YEARS, ZAIRE AND ANGOLA HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY IN EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY BY PROVIDING ASSIS-
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TANCE TO INSURGENT GROUPS ACROSS THIS BORDER. THE REDUCTION OF TENSION ALONG THE ZAIRE-ANGOLA BORDER CAN ONLY COME ABOUT IF THESE TWO NATIONS REACH AN AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THEIR MUTUAL BORDERS AND RENOUNCE INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. PAST NIGERIAN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE SUCH AN AGREEMENT WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. WE WILL WORK FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

THE AFRICAN FORCES NOW IN SHABA TO SECURE THE AREA AND TO PERMIT RETURN OF THE ZAIRIAN ECONOMY TO NORMALCY NOW TOTALS OVER 2,000 MEN. OUR OWN LIMITED COMMITMENT WAS TO PROVIDE AIRLIFT FOR THE MEN AND MATERIAL INVOLVED. WE HAVE MET THAT COMMITMENT EFFECTIVELY AND RAPIDLY; ALL OUR PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THE LIFT HAVE NOW RETURNED TO THEIR BASES IN THE UNITED STATES OR EUROPE. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL

PARTIES CONCERNED ARE ANXIOUS TO REPLACE THESE AFRICAN FORCES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH DISCIPLINED, WELL-TRAINED ZAIRIAN TROOPS, AND WE ARE CONSULTING ABOUT THE NEED FOR A TERMINAL DATE FOR THE OPERATION.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

THE PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA CONTINUES TO BE A PRIMARY FOCUS OF OUR AFRICA POLICY.

IT IS NOT NECESSARY THAT I REVIEW HERE THE ENTIRE NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF OUR RECENT EFFORTS WITH THE BRITISH TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA.

WE ARE UNDER CONFLICTING PRESSURES TO ENDORSE ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER IN THIS DISPUTE. ABROAD, MANY PEOPLE URGE
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US TO BACK THE PATRIOTIC FRONT. AT HOME, WE ARE OFTEN ASKED TO BACK IAN SMITH AND THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.

IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO BE DRAWN INTO FAVORING ONE SIDE OR ANOTHER. IF WE DID SO, WE COULD NO LONGER ACT AS A HONEST BROKER BETWEEN THEM. IN THE ABSENCE OF MEDIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES, THE CHANCES FOR A CIVIL WAR WOULD INCREASE. WE BELIEVE THAT A SETTLEMENT IS STILL

POSSIBLE.

THE BROKER'S ROLE IS NOT AN EASY ONE, AS WE HAVE LEARNED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HERE AGAIN WE NEED THE COMMITTEE'S GUIDANCE AS WELL AS ITS HELP IN EXPLAINING THE SITUATION TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

IN NAMIBIA, WE ARE CLOSE TO A SETTLEMENT, BUT WE CAN NOT FORGET THAT MISTRUST BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS DEEP AND THAT A SETTLEMENT MAY STILL ELUDE US. OVER THE FOURTEEN LONG MONTHS OF NEGOTIATION WE HAVE SUCCEEDED, WITH THE VALUABLE ASSISTANCE OF THE FRONT LINE STATES, IN NARROWING WHAT WAS AN ENORMOUS GAP BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF SWAPO AND SOUTH AFRICA. TWO ISSUES REMAIN: THE FUTURE OF THE PORT OF WALVIS BAY AND THE LOCATION OF RESIDUAL SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES WHICH WILL STAY IN NAMIBIA DURING THE TRANSITION.

WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE ISSUES OF THE FUTURE OF THE PORT OF WALVIS BAY CAN BE RESOLVED. THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOP LOCATION, GIVEN THE MISTRUST EXACERBATED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN RAID ON SWAPO CAMPS IN ANGOLA, WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT. BECAUSE OF SWAPO'S CLOSE DEPENDENCE ON ANGOLAN SUPPORT, THE INFLUENCE OF THE

ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT IN ACHIEVING A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT IS
EXTREMELY IMPORTANT.

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HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR

IN THE AREA OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS THE PRESIDENT
AND I CONTINUE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY
TO CHANNEL OUR CONCERNS AND ADVANCE OUR HUMAN RIGHTS
INTERESTS. OBVIOUSLY OUR OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO SCORE
DEBATING POINTS, BUT TO SEEK MEASURABLE IMPROVEMENT IN
HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN THE USSR. WE HAVE NO WAY TO
ENSURE THAT PERSONS SUCH AS SHCHARANSKIY, ORLOV, GINSBURG
AND SLEPAK ARE SPARED HARSH TREATMENT, BUT WE HAVE MADE
KNOWN TO THE SOVIETS THE ADVERSE AFFECT SUCH TREATMENT HAS
ON AMERICAN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION AND ULTI-
MATELY ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

WORKING WITH THE CONGRESS

ACHIEVING THE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES I HAVE MENTIONED
DEPENDS ON A CLOSE AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT.

WE ARE NOW FACED WITH A BROAD ARRAY OF STATUTORY

PROHIBITIONS, CONDITIONS, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND
COMPLEX PROCEDURES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT MANY OF THE LEGIS-
LATIVE RESTRICTIONS WHICH NOW FILL THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
LEGISLATION WERE DRAFTED IN RESPONSE TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH
ABUSES OF AUTHORITY AND THE LEGITIMATE DESIRE OF THE
CONGRESS TO BE MORE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN FOREIGN POLICY
MATTERS.

WE BELIEVE THAT SOME OF THE LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS
OF THE PAST CAN BE MODIFIED OR RESTRUCTURED IN A WAY THAT
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WILL PRESERVE THE LEGITIMATE ROLE OF CONGRESS AS AN EFFEC-
TIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY.
OUR GOAL IS SIMPLY TO MAKE THE PROCESS AS EFFICIENT AS
POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO SERVE THE US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CONDUCTED A STUDY OF THESE
CONSTRAINTS. IT IS NOW WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS
REVIEW. I EXPECT TO DISCUSS THE STUDY WITH HIM IN THE
VERY NEAR FUTURE. AFTER I HAVE DONE SO, WE WILL CONSULT
WITH THE CONGRESS ABOUT POSSIBLE SHORT AND LONG TERM

CHANGES.

WE ARE AWARE THAT IT IS LATE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS TO PROPOSE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE PENDING BILLS. IN VIEW OF THIS FACT, ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES WHICH WE MAY PROPOSE WILL MOST LIKELY HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL NEXT YEAR. IN THE MEANTIME, WE WILL STRONGLY OPPOSE NEW RESTRICTIONS IN PENDING LEGISLATION, PARTICULARLY PROHIBITIONS ON INDIRECT AID TO SPECIFIC COUNTRIES. WE WILL WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THIS COMMITTEE IN ANY PROPOSALS WE MAY MAKE TO REVISE THE STATUTES GOVERNING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

THE VOTE ON THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE APPROPRIATION BILL THIS WEEK IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE IN THIS REGARD.

THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE HAS CUT OVER \$1 BILLION FROM OUR \$8.4 BILLION FOREIGN AID REQUEST. IN ADDITION WE EXPECT AMENDMENTS TO BE OFFERED WHICH COULD CUT THIS SUM BY ANOTHER BILLION DOLLARS. WHILE WE WILL NOT TRY TO RESTORE THE ORIGINAL CUTS ON THE FLOOR, WE BELIEVE THAT ADDITIONAL CUTS WOULD SEVERELY DISRUPT THESE PROGRAMS AND HAVE SERIOUS FOREIGN POLICY CONSEQUENCES. WE ASK THAT YOU VOTE AGAINST THESE CUTS AND CONTINUE TO WORK WITH US IN GATHERING SUPPORT TO HOLD THE LINE ON PRESENT LEVELS. END TEXT VANCE UNQUOTE VANCE
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